

El grupo paranoide

Chapter 17

Uniformization

PEDRO CUBERO BROS

Uniformization in the different types of PCG

Dynamics underlying uniformization

Copying

Differentiation

Immobilism

The culture of the PCG

National language

Fabrication of the language

Eradication of other languages

The officialization

Persecution and prohibitions

Resurrection, purification and invention

Writing

Reason and paranoia

Linguistic homogenization in the rest of paranoid contagion groups

Jargon

Peculiar style

Museum languages

Dress and external appearance

Social etiquette

Celebrations

Eating habits

Group identification symbols

Aesthetic sense

Music

Law

Religion

Identity, Utopia, and Enemies

Uniformization in the different types of PCG

When one meets several people with a prolonged militancy in the same cult group, one gets the sense that, in *some way*, they resemble each other beyond what is *natural*, especially in the more absorbing groups. Whether in their clothing, social customs, or use of language, the members of each group seem to share a particular cultural pattern. For the cult member, the range of options is more restricted and originality more avoided, which inevitably leads us to the aforementioned impression that they have undergone a process of *uniformization* with the rest of the group.

Nationalism also imposes upon its children the obligation to adopt, with enthusiasm, the cultural elements duly sanctioned as "national." Just like the cult group, the nation takes advantage of individuals' favorable disposition to modify their own behavior in accordance with the patterns set by the homeland.

Nationalist utopia. The social contract.

"Alongside this exaltation of the State in Rousseau's thought, there also appears the exaltation of patriotism and of national traditions, as a means to foster and intensify solidarity among citizens" (44).

Nationalism.

"From the French Revolution emerged, thus, a new nationalism [...] The citizen was to feel identified with the State[-Nation] [...] fostering love for traditions, the exclusion of foreign models and the abandonment of cosmopolitanism" (44).

The patriot willingly lends himself to making his nation's cultural patterns his own or, in other words, to *identifying himself, making himself identical*. The greater the paranoidism, the more fields in which homogenization occurs, and with greater depth in each of them. This is a dynamic that, taken to its limit, would lead to transforming all members of the group into *absolutely equal* individuals (which, obviously, is impossible).

In its homogenizing endeavor, the Nation-State may resort to another somewhat more drastic method, one that does not contemplate individuals but entire populations: the elimination of those who are *too different* and cannot or will not be integrated.

Turkish nationalism.

"[...] as when the *Young Turks* attempt to convert the decrepit empire into a homogeneous nation. Militarism and violence toward the other then dominate the scene, and it is no coincidence that from that political renewal the first great genocide of our century emerges,

the extermination of a million and a half Armenians in eastern Anatolia between 1915 and 1917" (15).

Toward its own minorities, the SP oscillates between two opposing poles: either rigid segregation, extermination, or expulsion, on one hand (that is, open intolerance of differences), or assimilation, on the other (which amounts to yet another form of intolerance). In other words, minorities either cannot *be* (there)...

Flemish nationalism.

"[...] The settlement of new foreigners in Brussels further harms the Flemish character of Brussels and the surrounding municipalities,' it says. The Blok advocates the 'accompanied return of immigrants'..." (4).

[...] or they cannot *remain* (as they are).

French nationalism.

"At the same time, the disappearance of the segregation of minorities as a cohesive force and the pressure toward assimilation that followed the revolutionary decrees concerning religious tolerance weakened the bonds upon which the religious identity of those non-Catholic communities depended" (60).

Even without intending to, the uniformization of fellow nationals induced by nationalist action lends an appearance of reality, albeit an illusory one, to the myth of common origins; what is artificial and recent is seen, and wished to be seen, as a product of *nature* reaching back to the dawn of time.

Nationalism.

"To regard the unity and homogeneity of the nation-state as an institution granted by God was a dangerous foreshortening of our European historical perspective. In fact, national homogeneity —as it exists today— has a very short past, and some of the particularly brutal efforts to create such homogeneity are recorded in living memory" (22).

In mGPs (induced psychotic disorders, domestic tyrannies...), does this uniformization characteristic of nationalisms and sectarian groups also occur? Some clinical observations point in that direction.

Folie à deux.

"b) For that intellectual work [the work that leads to the emergence of the delusion] to be carried out in two different minds, it is necessary that those two individuals share, over a long period of time, a life entirely in common, in the same environment, sharing the same

way of living, the same feelings, the same interests, the same fears and hopes, and that they remain removed from any outside influence" (38).

Folie à deux. Case of the monozygotic twins.

"[...] they dress in an identical manner with earrings and many hoops, chains, bead necklaces and costume jewelry on their forearms and necks. It is difficult to separate them. They have the same food preferences and sleep at the edge of the bed because 'the center is for the Angel'" (53).

The author suggests that living together, homogeneity —a "same way of living"— and isolation from the outside world are the factors that predispose to the emergence of delusion, the fertile ground in which it arises. But, seen from another perspective, the homogeneity of the delusional pair is not the cause but the consequence, a mere manifestation of the paranoidization process just as the delusions themselves are.

Does the same occur in other paranoid contagion groups?

Domestic tyranny.

"A young university student, traumatized by the sudden death of her sister two years earlier, falls desperately in love with a boy from another city. He soon shows signs of an extremely possessive and jealous character, calling her at all hours and controlling her every move. He abandons a job the day after starting it, as he needs to be near his beloved. A background of occupational maladjustment, strong religiosity, and poverty soon becomes evident. Gradually, the young woman distances herself from her family to move into her boyfriend's home, a flat packed with people where she isolates herself from the world and devotes herself to caring for her beloved, whom she not only attentively serves vermouth but also puts his socks on for him — an attitude that no one would previously have anticipated. They go through great hardships, she gives up a publicly funded home she had been allocated in her own city, and she learns that it is not her place to demand that her beloved work" (48).

This story is similar to those that can be heard with some frequency from the mouths of battered women. But as if that were not enough...

Domestic tyranny. Clinical case.

"The boy is Armenian, and lives with his family and other Armenians. For her part, the young woman barely leaves the flat, where no national television programme is ever heard. Armenian television is received via an antenna and is the only thing heard throughout the day; yet the young woman continues to make progress in the language. She learns to make

bread and cheese according to Armenian tradition. She dances Armenian dances with her new family. At mealtimes, she toasts with one small glass of vodka after another to relatives she has never met. She used to be teetotal. And she shows more interest in the Armenian genocide than in the present of her own country" (48).

The paranoidism of the PI does not derive from any contagion within a group that could serve as a model with which to identify. Obviously, it is not possible for him to conform to a group that -for him- does not exist. Even so, some clinical observation already suggests a propensity of the PI to mimic something that is greater than himself.

The paranoid relationship. Tizón.

"This partially explains the liking [...] for uniforms, congregations, cults" (55).

Dynamics underlying uniformization

Copying

The uniformization of the members of the PCG is due to a tendency toward imitation produced by the very state of paranoidization. The member of the PCG observes what they see in the group and makes it their own, incorporating it.

The imitative tendency is particularly intense in relation to the leader, which is entirely understandable when the latter is exalted, deified, and presented as the model of perfection to be followed.

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"One must always strive to resemble the founder" (48).

However, imitation also occurs in behaviors that are secondary in nature from the point of view of the group's ideology and which the PCG makes no effort to instill. Followers reproduce the culinary preferences of the leader, his aversion or fondness for tobacco, and even the hobbies of their idolized chief, without being compelled by anyone and even without being aware of the imitative origin of their behavior.

Maoist Leninism.

"Among Mao's hobbies was swimming. Among his feats, that of having crossed the turbulent waters of the Yangtze River on two occasions (1956 and 1957). In 1966, his collaborators, what we would now call image advisors, advised him to do it again. The masses would be grateful. So saw the magazine 'Peking Review' of the time. 'It was 9:20 in the morning of

June 16. In the city of Wuhan, a massive popular swimming event was about to begin on the Yangtze River. Suddenly, a motorboat appeared coming from the East, where the sun rises. A man stood out on the deck; when he was recognized, joy spread: The Chairman Mao is among us! Long live Chairman Mao!'.
 After removing his bathrobe, Mao jumped into the water and swam downstream for 65 minutes, covering some 15 kilometers. From that day on, swimming became China's national sport. Rivers, ponds, irrigation ditches, canals, harbors, and beaches were invaded by ardent revolutionaries. Everything Mao did was good..." (45).

Differentiation

Fascism.

"The extreme nationalism of every fascist movement inevitably produced in each group certain distinctive or idiosyncratic traits, so that each fascist organization tended to differ more from its counterparts in other countries than, say, any given communist party did from other communist groups" (46).

This tendency to be different, to differentiate themselves, which the author attributes to *extreme nationalism* seems to be the group-level reflection of a characteristic mode of behavior of the IP.

Persecuted-persecutors.

"[...] bizarre, eccentric beings, irregular, undisciplined, and uncoercible" (47).

Paranoia.

"Patients with delusional disorder [...] are regarded more as eccentric than odd" (40).

Now then, this *stepping away from the center* of the IP would not be a simple unnoticed or unwanted trait, but something sought after to a certain extent.

Factor QIV of the 16PF test.

"[...] strong desire to overturn existing customs " (33).

In turn, this desire may be understandable if we take into account the *superiority complex* that afflicts the IP. One must distance oneself and mark the differences with those whom one holds in contempt.

Paranoiac character.

"[...] feeling of being misunderstood, whose distressing character is at times erased by the vain satisfaction of feeling different from others and, consequently, superior to them" (18).

It may be suspected that if the members of the paranoid contagion group make themselves equal to one another, it is, at the same time, to make themselves different from others, like the paranoiac eccentric.

Nazism.

"To this end, it is important, then, that the life of the German colonist be absolutely different from that of the indigenous people. Ours will have to avoid frequenting the taverns stained by their spittle" (24).

In this effort to differentiate themselves, the paranoid contagion group can also apply itself to the task of preventing others from adopting its own cultural patterns.

Nazism.

"The best means of preventing any mingling with the population is to encourage it to preserve its customs without any change. In this way, we will not run the risk of being confused with them by their outward appearance" (24).

In the paranoid contagion group, cultural expressions acquire an additional value as they are transformed into signals of a particular identity. And for these cultural elements to act as conspicuous labels communicating belonging to one group or another, it is necessary that those cultural elements be as exclusive and differentiated from those of the surrounding environment as possible. Uniformization (internal) and differentiation (from the outside world) are two sides of the same coin.

Basque nationalism provides us with a good example. The choice of Basque as the national language over other alternatives (such as Castilian, a language also Basque in origin, or the creation of a new codified language based on the dialectal variant of Spanish spoken by the Basques, a possibility that was at one point considered), is justified, by some patriots, with arguments that do not stray beyond the realm of symbolism. Spanish must be displaced as a symbol of the power of the Spanish State, and Basque must be imposed as a symbol of Basque sovereignty. The choice of national language is placed on the same plane as the *flag wars*.

Basque nationalism.

"The contradictions of the new radical nationalism regarding the question of language had already manifested themselves in 1963 in the work of the Bilbao-born writer Federico Krutwig, who was in several respects an inspiration for ETA in the 1960s. This author acknowledges in *Vasconia* that Castilian is a language born in territory bordering that of the Basque language, and considers plausible its definition as 'the Romance spoken by Basques', and even concedes that 'from very ancient times it has been linked to the Basque people [as it is] the language of the Fueros, of the Courts of Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa and Navarra, this

kingdom having been the first to adopt it as an official language in place of Latin'. This is not sufficient, however, to consider Castilian one of the languages of the Basques, given that 'it has become a symbol of the oppressor State and the means of denationalization of the Euskaldun people'" (56).

As we can see, there is no reference whatsoever to Romantic arguments relating to the Basque language as an integral part of an eternal Basque *soul*...

Another example may prove illustrative. Attendance at *aplecs sardanistes* is at once a recreational act and, for many, an act of nationalist affirmation. There is no doubt that, had the sardana (a dance from the Ampurdan region) not been chosen some more than a century ago as a symbol of Catalan identity, today it would hardly be heard or danced. The vitality of flamenco in Andalusia, by contrast, has a considerably more *natural* character. Few of those who attend a concert of that musical genre do so as an act of Andalusian affirmation, nor do they experience any Andalusianist emotion. They simply enjoy flamenco.

The individual who integrates into a sectarian group adopts its subculture, and in this way becomes equal to the rest of the group's members while differentiating themselves from the wider society from which they come.

But the process of uniformization goes beyond this *individual identification*. It is the paranoid contagion group itself that carries out a process of selection, adoption and elimination of cultural elements that causes its culture and customs to gradually distance themselves from those of neighboring groups.

Czech nationalism

"[...] refused to participate in the elections of the Frankfurt Parliament and launched a campaign against every symbol of German identity" (44).

Sokagakkai.

"In truth, incorrect worship was being paid there to numerous Buddhist statues that had stood on that site for hundreds of years. No one knew precisely when they had been placed in the temple, but Hisakawa decided that they had to be removed, in order to safeguard the purity of True Buddhism. He explained to the parishioners of the Myofuku-ji temple that the Nichiren Shoshu, the true and orthodox cult of the Buddhism of Nichiren Daishonin, could not allow those statues to remain on the temple grounds, and could by no means promulgate that they be venerated. But the local people, who had revered the statues for centuries, opposed their removal, ignoring the nature of True Buddhism..." (29).

In nationalism, the contrived process of selecting the cultural elements that will be catalogued as one's own scrutinizes the past to determine which are the authentic roots, eliminating what is classified as foreign additions that came later.

German nationalism.

"Germany could only truly free itself and be capable of carrying out its great mission if it overcame these pernicious effects and returned, as much as possible, to the land. Völkisch culture thus preached a kind of retreat toward nature, cultural purification, and social unity" (46).

Basque nationalism

"[...] in the rational and practical exclusion of everything that does not bear, printed in fixed and indelible characters, the seal of plainly Basque origin, inexorably discarding everything exotic" (56).

Turkish nationalism.

"In accordance with this background, even today Turkey struggles with serious difficulties in assuming a historical legacy where many of the principal contributions belong to the defeated adversaries of the dominant Turkish line, Greeks and Armenians in the foreground. It is true that in the thirties the breadth of spirit characteristic of Mustafa Kemal turned some of the principal Byzantine monuments of Istanbul into museums: Hagia Sophia, Chora. But whoever attempts today to visit the remaining temples with mosaic decorations in the former capital will encounter practically insurmountable obstacles: no custodian is to be found, it is under restoration, and so on. In other cases, such as in Cappadocia, in the areas of Görene or Peristrema, the protection of the Byzantine legacy is minimal and some native visitors — who frequently sign and date their crime — continue carrying out the vandalistic work of destroying the faces of the saints and turning the paintings into a jumble of *graffiti*. Why place a custodian in each one? Even at Nemrud Dagi, the mountain sanctuary of Antiochus of Commagene, the reliefs in which the Hellenic monarch clasps his hand with that of Hercules have seen both heads disappear. Perhaps the official explanation will be the fall of a hailstorm or an earthquake, just as the vandalism of the cave churches is attributed to stone-throwing by ignorant children from the surrounding areas. A final and dramatic sign of abandonment: the progressive ruin of the temples of what was once the Armenian capital, the city of Ani, fundamental to the history of architecture between the tenth and twelfth centuries. The magnificent octagonal Church of the Redeemer collapses further year by year, without the slightest effort at shoring up or conservation. Meanwhile, just a few meters away, restoration

work has begun on some Seljuk baths, of secondary importance and with no apparent danger" (15).

In a large part of the crisis cults the same dynamic is apparent.

Crisis cults. Smohalla (19th century).

"... Smohalla was not only opposed to agriculture, he also wanted no animals domesticated by the white men" (35).

Crisis cults. Lauliwasikaw (19th century).

"They were to have no more than one dog per family..." (35).

Crisis cults. The Delaware prophet (19th century).

"The animals had disappeared from the forests, said the Lord, because of the wickedness that the Indians displayed in their new ways of life, for example, by using foul-smelling gunpowder for hunting instead of the bow and arrows" (35).

Crisis cults. The Baniwa Venancio (19th century).

"The messiah, educated by a European priest, was systematically opposed to the adoption of cultural elements introduced by the Spanish. His teachings and prescriptions were aimed at preventing acculturation, despite the inevitable fusion with Christian doctrine" (51).

On other occasions the paranoid contagion groups do not recreate traditions but rather invent them, looking to the future more than to the past and more imbued with messianic meaning than concerned with primordial quintessences.

Maoist Leninism.

"For several days traffic was plunged into complete confusion. It was considered unacceptably counter-revolutionary for red to indicate the obligation to stop. Logically, it had to mean advance. And traffic was not to proceed, as was customary, on the right, but was to be moved to the left. For a few days, we banned traffic police from carrying out their work and took over the control of traffic ourselves" (32).

Sometimes one gets the feeling that the selection and adoption of differentiating cultural patterns aims not only to differentiate, but also to bring about confrontation with the surrounding environment and to stoke its rejection. The intent would be not only to be different, but also to *provoke* the hostility of the surrounding environment, conflict with it and, if it comes to that, martyrdom.

Sectarian groups. Jehovah's Witnesses.

"Jehovah's Witnesses are well known for the fact that they do not accept blood transfusions. Why do they take this stance? Because the Bible clearly shows that blood represents the life, or soul, of the creature and is therefore sacred. After the Flood, when Noah was given permission to eat the flesh of animals, he was strictly warned: 'Only flesh with its soul — its blood — you must not eat.' (Genesis 9:4) This prohibition was specifically repeated in the Law that God gave to the nation of Israel. (Leviticus 17:10.) Later, the holy spirit and the apostles established the requirement that Christians also continue 'abstaining from things sacrificed to idols, *and from blood*, and from things strangled, and from fornication.' (Acts 15:28,29.)

Jehovah's Witnesses are among the few groups of people who still observe the divine prohibition against eating blood. Are they being unreasonable about it? Furthermore, it appears that today they are the only ones who maintain that this prohibition also applies to blood transfusions" (36).

In summary. Paranoid contagion groups carry out a work of cultural manipulation and manipulation of customs, through the resurrection, refinement, and invention of cultural elements. In turn, the paranoid contagion group's "cultural package" makes the group member resemble the rest of the members of the group while, simultaneously, differentiating them from the surrounding environment.

Immobilism

Once they have identified with a particular cultural pattern, the paranoid prone individual practices an immobilism that leads them to adhere rigidly to that pattern, barely allowing themselves to be influenced by the surrounding environment.

Paranoidism in general. SCL-90.

"A 10-item scale of Hmong culture assessed the use of the Hmong language at home, food, dress, social rituals, traditional health practices, social roles, traditional religious practice, the celebration of the Hmong New Year, and the frequency of contact with other Hmong. A high score on the SCL paranoid ideation scale was associated with a high score on the Hmong culture scale..." (59).

I have been able to observe in some paranoid patients of a certain age that, in their language, their way of dressing, or their way of relating to others, they display patterns that correspond to those that were common a few decades ago, without having changed with the passage of time to the same extent as

other people of their generation did. They remain, therefore, *outdated*. Probably a reflection of the same immobility and mental inflexibility.

The culture of the PCG

National language

In the pages that follow we will review the areas in which the homogenizing dynamic manifests itself, beginning with what is without doubt the most prominent: that of language, to which nationalism generally attributes far greater importance than other PCGs. The vast majority of nationalisms, as we already know, set themselves the objective of linguistic unification, in a fully conscious manner, and sometimes with a certain virulence. The implementation of the national language necessarily takes place at the expense of the other languages used before the emergence of nationalism; the imposition of one language and the eradication of the others go hand in hand.

The goal, it must be stressed, is for the administration and those administered to express themselves in a single language, the same everywhere, and a language, if possible, not shared with any other nation. Each citizen, *equal to* (identified with) their fellow citizens and *distinct from* foreigners.

The national language, furthermore, cannot be limited to serving as a mere vehicle for everyday oral communication but must be suited to a learned use that allows laws to be drafted in it, news to be disseminated, scientific knowledge to be transmitted, and novels to be written and classical texts to be translated.

Fabrication of the language

Nationalism.

"'National languages' [...] were, very frequently, an artificial creation, for they had to be compiled, standardized, homogenized and modernized for contemporary and literary use, from the puzzle of local or regional dialects that constituted the non-literary languages as they were spoken" (26).

An artificial creation in response to a twofold need:

That of endowing the language with a sufficient vocabulary to meet the multiple "learned" needs mentioned above (that vocabulary was absent in the languages that until then had been used exclusively in oral form).

And the need to establish a unified grammar, spelling, and vocabulary that would transcend the differences between dialects that were often mutually incomprehensible.

The result of this work of *linguistic engineering* is the true languages, of a somewhat different nature from their appearance.

Nationalism.

"Modern languages are consequently almost always semi-artificial constructions and occasionally, like modern Hebrew, virtually invented. They are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely, the primordial foundation of national culture and the matrix of the national spirit" (27).

In the task of manufacturing the language, the most contentious part would often be the choice of which dialect to use as the mold in which to shape the national language.

Nationalism.

"[National languages] are usually attempts to manufacture a standardized language from the multiplicity of languages that are actually spoken, which are from that point on downgraded to dialects, the main problem in their construction usually being which dialect to choose as the basis for the standardized and homogenized language. The subsequent problems of standardizing and homogenizing national grammar and spelling, and the addition of new elements to the vocabulary, are secondary. The history of virtually all European languages insists on this regional basis: literary Bulgarian is based on the western Bulgarian language, literary Hungarian emerges in the sixteenth century from the combination of several dialects, literary Latvian is based on the central of the three variants, Lithuanian on one or two, and so on. Where, as is usually the case with languages that achieve literary status in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, the names of the architects of the language are known, this choice may be arbitrary (although justified with arguments)" (27).

Now, not all nationalisms found themselves compelled to undertake the task of standardizing the language. With some languages, the work had already been carried out by the absolutist monarchies.

Nationalism.

"The great written national languages of nation-states or cultivated cultures had passed through that phase of compilation and 'correction' much earlier: German and Russian in the eighteenth century, French and English in the seventeenth century, Castilian and Italian even earlier"(26).

Eradication of other languages

French nationalism.

"The new French revolutionary patriotism[...]launched a homogenizing offensive against all the[...]pre-existing languages before the revolution"(44).

Given that the starting point of movements tending toward the establishment of nation-states was almost always multilingualism, linguistic unification would have to be achieved in opposition to other languages, namely:

Languages other than the national one, established in a portion of the national territory (such as Basque — from the perspective of Spanish nationalism, of course —, Breton, or the languages of North American indigenous peoples). Consider that, in some cases, the vast majority of the population was unfamiliar with what was supposedly their own language.

French nationalism.

"At any rate, while the dialect that serves as the basis for a national language is actually spoken, it does not matter that those who speak it are a minority, as long as it is a minority with sufficient political weight. In this sense, French is essential to the concept of France, even though in the France of 1789 50% of the French did not speak it at all, only 12-13% spoke it 'correctly' — and in fact outside a central region it was not ordinarily spoken even within the area of the langue d'oïl, except in cities, and not always in their outskirts. In northern and southern France virtually nobody spoke French. If the French had at least a state whatever their national language might be, the only basis for Italian unification was the Italian language, which united the educated elite of the peninsula as readers and writers, even though it was estimated that at the moment of unification (1860) only 2.5% of the population used the language for everyday purposes"(27).

Dialectal variants of the national language tend to be viewed with suspicion by nationalism. Not without reason, one of the purposes behind the creation of national languages is that of overcoming the mutual incomprehension between dialects.

Nazism.

"Mr. Glasmeier must ensure that within the framework of popular concerts no dialects are to be used" (5).

The languages of minorities not settled in a specific territory (Jews, Gypsies, foreigners...).

The cosmopolitan languages of the aristocratic elites and, in general, any "foreign" language that might be used as the primary administrative or cultural language.

Nationalism.

"[...] it was first necessary to choose a national vernacular (in a standardized literary form) over more prestigious, holy or classical languages, or both, which were, for small elites, perfectly practical means of administrative or intellectual communication, public debate or even —one thinks of the classical Persian of the Mughal empire, the classical Chinese of Heian Japan— of literary composition" (27).

For several centuries Greek Cypriots and Bosnians readily accepted the use of Turkish as an administrative or cultural language, and the same was true of the non-German-speaking inhabitants of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Luxembourg citizens continue to use French as the official language of the State and a German dialect at home.

Finnish nationalism.

"[...] the observed fact that, when linguistic lines crystallized in Finland at the end of the nineteenth century, 'the proportion of intellectuals who spoke Swedish was several times greater than that of common people who spoke it', that is, that educated Finns continued to find Swedish more useful than their mother tongue" (27).

But this dichotomy between the language of colloquial use and the predominantly written language of literary, scientific or administrative use is completely unacceptable from the perspective of nationalism, which demands that all its citizens employ the national language at all times and for all purposes, and which does not admit that the "true" language of the homeland be relegated to a *status* of *patois* for domestic use.

The next question that arises for us concerns the means by which nationalism achieves the objective of linguistic unification.

The officialization

The declaration of the *official* status of a given language in a State automatically allows it to be established in the administrative, educational, and military spheres (two institutions that, ultimately, also depend on the State). This simple measure makes it possible for the vast majority of the population to gain knowledge of the national language (with the possible exception of those marginal sectors that evade the compulsory schooling system, or of those children who are unable, for various reasons, to integrate into school) and establishes emotional and practical incentives for learning the language.

Nationalism.

"How, if not through the support of public authorities and recognition in administration and education, could domestic or rural languages be transformed into languages capable of competing with the prevailing languages of national or world culture, and moreover give reality to virtually nonexistent languages? What would have been the future of Hebrew, had the British authorities in Palestine not accepted it as one of the three official languages, at a time when the number of people using Hebrew as a language of daily use was fewer than 20,000?"(27).

So the officialization of the language allows all citizens to come to understand and to be able to express themselves in the national language, including in writing and within a not excessively prolonged period of time. Dialects and other languages are thus relegated to the domestic or private sphere, but they tend to resist disappearing entirely (after more than two centuries of homogenizing pressure, there are still French citizens who express themselves, in their homes or with their friends, in Breton, Alsatian, or Occitan).

But the radicalization of linguistic nationalism means that this is not enough. It is necessary to do away entirely with all other languages.

Persecution and prohibitions

It is at that moment that the nationalist impulse takes measures to enforce the use of the national language even outside official spheres.

Flemish nationalism

"Flemish nationalists wish to reclaim the European capital, legally recognized as the capital of Flanders, and halt the advance of French, which spreads 'like an oil slick' from this city and at the same time the only region recognized as bilingual. Despite the linguistic border that encircles Brussels, the tendency of young couples and many workers is to seek housing in the outskirts, where housing prices are more affordable. There, territorial language laws and their zealous guardians prevent the broadcasting of French-language television channels by cable, place obstacles in the way of non-Flemish families settling or disseminate their official communications, tax forms or traffic fines only in Dutch" (4).

Francoism

"As early as 1945, railing venomously against this practice, Borges wrote: 'I hear that in the provinces dubbing has been well received.' It is worth recalling once more that dubbing was

made compulsory in that great province that was Franco's Spain, following the victory of the *Nationalists* (for reasons of a political, not cultural, nature) ..." (41).

One can still act with even greater forcefulness.

Cambodian Leninism. Khmer Rouge.

"[...] Pol Pot's Kampuchea, which condemned the knowledge of foreign languages with the death penalty..." (43).

Resurrection, purification and invention

We have not exhausted the manifestations of nationalism in language policy. In some cases, though admittedly few and not always successfully, patriots chose as their national language a language that was already extinct or in serious danger of extinction, rather than the one spoken by the majority of their fellow countrymen. Always with the same arguments: authenticity and/or symbolism.

Irish nationalism.

"In 1893 -when the nationalist movement organized by Parnell was beginning to decline, and Parnell himself had died in 1891- Douglas Hyde founded the Gaelic League with the aim of reviving Gaelic as the Irish national language, which was in evident crisis due to the spread of English" (44).

The case of Zionism is illustrative. For many long centuries, Jews had spoken the languages of their surroundings (Aramaic, Greek, Spanish, German, Arabic...), maintaining their distinct identity as a group through compliance with Levitical prescriptions and fidelity to the Book. It would not be until just over a century ago, with the emergence of a modern Jewish nationalism (otherwise of a rather secular orientation, at least initially) that a good number of them would decide to learn reinvented Hebrew, including its own alphabet.

Zionist nationalism.

"As for the Zionist Jews, they went even further by identifying the Jewish nation with Hebrew, a language that Jews had not used for everyday life since the days of the Babylonian captivity, if they had ever used it at all. It had just been invented (in 1880) as a language for everyday use -distinct from the sacred or ritual language, or from a *lingua franca* of culture- by a man who began the process of providing it with an adequate vocabulary, inventing a Hebrew term for 'nationalism,' and that language was learned more as a sign of nationalist commitment than as a means of communication" (26).

Another interesting manifestation of linguistic nationalism is the elimination of all those elements (basically words) considered foreign. It is always a matter of seeking what is authentic, what is autochthonous, and of avoiding foreign contamination. Purification is of particular importance at the moment of the codification of the language.

Norwegian nationalism.

"In Norway the nationalist Wergeland (1808-1845) demanded a Norwegian more purely Norwegian, as opposed to the excessively Danicized written language, and such a language was promptly constructed (landsmal, known today as nynorsk). Despite official support after Norway became independent, it has never established itself as more than a minority language of the country, which, since 1947 has been *de facto* bilingual in writing, with nynorsk confined to 20% of Norwegians, especially those living in western and central Norway" (27).

Furthermore, it is necessary to remain vigilant, since at any moment foreign words can infiltrate the sacred language of the ancestors.

French nationalism.

"In fact, languages become more conscious exercises in social engineering insofar as their symbolic meaning prevails over their actual use, as evidenced by the various movements to 'indigenize' or make the vocabulary more truly 'national'; the struggle of French governments against 'franglais' is the best recent example. The underlying passions are easy to understand, but they have nothing to do with speaking, writing, understanding, or even the spirit of literature" (27).

A curiosity. At least one nationalism, in the full throes of messianic fervor, came up with the idea of creating its own language, *differentiated* from the one of origin, transposing to the linguistic field the rationalist perfection that, according to them, distinguished their nation.

North American nationalism

"Some Americans of patriotic spirit strongly maintained that Americans should create their own language, correcting the many imperfections of English, just as American statesmen had essentially improved the British Constitution. Back in 1790, the great lexicographer and philologist Noah Webster (1758-1843), father of the dictionary that is one of the enduring glories of American scholarship, maintained: 'Now is the time, and *this* is the country where we may expect success in attempting changes favorable to language, science and government'. Three years later, his colleague William Thornton spoke thus to the American people: 'You have corrected the dangerous doctrines of European powers, let us now correct

the languages we have imported, for the oppressed of different nations knock at our doors.' He maintained that if this were done, 'The *American language* will be as distinct an entity as the government, free from all the follies of unphilosophical caprice, and founded on truth as its only regulator'. But there were three good reasons that determined the ultimate failure of the attempt to bifurcate the languages. In the first place, Thornton's practical proposal for reform involved changing the writing system, which entailed not only a phonetics that seemed ridiculous to people, but a series of signs he had invented that were incomprehensible to everyone" (31).

Writing

The dynamics discussed thus far can also be imposed upon the field of writing. For example, the need to differentiate oneself from one's surroundings.

Romanian nationalism

"How, if not through state power, could Romanian nationalism insist (in 1863) on its Latin origins (as opposed to the surrounding Slavs and Magyars) by writing and printing the language in Roman characters instead of the Cyrillic script customary until that time? (27).

Or the search for one's own roots.

Nazism.

"It is advised that National Socialist literature be printed in Gothic characters, for distribution abroad"(5).

Or the eradication of the remainder of, in this case, scripts.

Maoist Leninism.

"The Chinese women of the canton of Shiangxuxu used for centuries a calligraphy of 2,000 characters, incomprehensible to men, which provides valuable elements concerning some of the most dramatic periods in the history of China... Professor Chen Qipuang, aged 65, is one of the few scholars who has mastered the alphabet of this form of communication which, in rhymed prose and verse, achieved great popularity in the province of Hunan in the times when Chinese society was governed strictly by the will of men... An elderly woman of 85, Yang Huanyi, is the only person in China who continues to write her memoirs in nushu (women's calligraphy) ... When Mao and the Communists came to power in 1949, and the purge of rightists subsequently began, the women who practised nushu encountered

difficulties. The political commissars, unable to understand the strokes, grew suspicious. The form of communication was then called 'the language of witches...' (3).

Reason and paranoia

The linguistic unification of the Nation-State responds to an evident practical motivation, given that a modern State and a developed society could hardly function normally if citizens were to express themselves exclusively through the multiplicity of languages and dialects used in the Ancien Régime, whose society was rigidly compartmentalized. Mutual incomprehension would hinder full freedom of movement (within the national territory), the freedom of citizens to establish contractual bonds among themselves, it would not be possible to communicate with the administration or to gain access to positions of employment within it, etc.

In some nations, it is these *practical considerations* that drove the majority to adopt the majority language and to discard that of their parents.

North American nationalism.

"It was many millions who decided to become members of the North American nation, which undoubtedly had no single ethnic basis and learned English driven by necessity and convenience, without the ideas of the national soul or national continuity playing any part in their efforts to speak the language" (26).

Now, while the *practical sense* of linguistic unification is evident, other considerations must be taken into account. The Swiss exception demonstrates to us that, on closer inspection, it is not absolutely essential to destroy linguistic diversity for a Nation-State to function adequately and provide freedom and prosperity to its citizens. And even accepting the convenience of a nation equipping itself with a single language so that citizens may understand one another and communicate with the administration, there is no need whatsoever to completely eradicate the remaining languages, when it is well known that bilingualism is perfectly possible and does not pose excessive complications, as the study of African or Amerindian societies makes evident. The *pragmatic sense* does not explain either the need to resurrect completely dead languages or those spoken only by a small number of peasants. The recovery of such languages entails an enormous effort, which is necessarily made to the detriment of other objectives and furthermore involves producing an inevitable linguistic isolation, not without its drawbacks. Nor do practical considerations have anything to do with the efforts to purge the language of its foreign elements, or to prevent its *contamination*.

The fact is that in the linguistic policy of nationalism, so different from the *laissez faire* of the Ancien Régime, there underlies, in addition to the obvious utilitarian considerations, the homogenizing/differ-

entiating impulse characteristic of paranoid contagion groups. Language, in a large part of nationalisms, becomes something more than a mere instrument of communication; it is a flag of group identity, a symbol.

Nazism.

"We have nothing against exceptions [regarding the use of dialects in the media] when they are necessary, but the Reich broadcaster in Berlin must ensure that pure German is spoken, as a symbol of unity" (5).

And, although it is mere speculation, it seems reasonable to suspect that the linguistic differentiation of the environment pursues, perhaps in a not fully conscious way, that which precisely constitutes its greatest drawback: lack of communication and isolation. An isolation that paranoid contagion groups, as we have seen in the previous chapter, impose upon themselves by many other means.

"Does not ignorance of the language of another group constitute the most obvious barrier to communication, and consequently the most obvious marker of the lines that separate groups: so that the creation or speaking of an argot still serves to identify persons as members of a subculture that wishes to separate itself from other subcultures or from the wider community?" (27).

Linguistic homogenization in the rest of paranoid contagion groups

Messianic movements. Pedro Verigin, Doukhobor leader (19th century).

"The dukhobor are finally free to go into exile. But where to go? Prince Peter Kropotkin, the celebrated anarchist theorist, will play a decisive role, as he will champion the cause of the dukhobor before Canadian officials. Fortunately, the Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton, is favorable to the arrival of the cult: he hopes that the cult will go on to colonize still virgin lands and above all accelerate the development of the distant province of Saskatchewan. The reasoning is sound, but it fails to account for the dukhobor specificity. Because, when the first immigrants arrive in 1898, they have only one idea in mind: to found their own society, far from other men and far from Canada.

From 1899 onward several communities are established in Saskatchewan that will always obstinately refuse to speak any language other than Russian" (6).

The homogenization and differentiation of language is not a phenomenon exclusive to nationalisms but rather, albeit to a lesser extent, affects paranoid contagion groups of a smaller size.

Jargon

The paranoid contagion group does not equip itself with a language of its own, but it can introduce modifications to the vocabulary, thereby creating a *jargon* shared by its adherents and unknown to the rest of the world.

Some create genuine neologisms.

Italian Fascism.

"The great majority of the delegates supported the transformation of the Fasci into a Nazionale Fascista (PNF), led by a central committee of nineteen members representing the various regions, and by an executive committee of eleven leaders, headed by Mussolini, whose leadership was once again accepted without dissent. He was known more and more as *Duce* ('guide,' 'leader'), a word that was part of the series of Roman neologisms popularized in the Fasci, and which in this case derived from the Latin *Dux*" (46).

Sectarian groups. Scientology.

"It is truly difficult to summarize the so varied and complex doctrine of this cult, but we could outline it from the basic Scientological dogma which postulates that man is a *Thetan* (his own conscious identity of being conscious) who inhabits a body and has an immortal soul that successively reincarnates before achieving liberation.

But the burden of traumas accumulated in previous existences (called 'engrams') prevents definitive liberation and is the origin of all the ills that afflict the individual in his current life (dominated by the 'reactive mind,' the portion of the mind that retains physical pain and misguided emotion).

What is internally called *tech* (short for technology), that is, the set of teachings and methods conceived by Ron Hubbard, the cult strives to convert traumatized 'pre-clears' (all non-cult members and those who have not yet reached a mythical Scientological status) into happy 'clears' (without a reactive mind), which is the indispensable step before beginning to travel 'The Bridge', the advanced courses that will lead the student to acquire the unparalleled powers of the O.T. levels (*Thetan Operance*), capable, among other magnificent feats, of allowing control over M.E.S.T. (that is, Matter, Energy, Space and Time)" (49).

Cult groups. TFP.

"Some examples of their own words:

- SDP: señor Don Plinio
- TAO: this is the specific vocation of being a member of the TFP" (48).

Others elaborate "semantic neologisms" in which a novel meaning is added to pre-existing words

Cult groups. TFP.

"The following words form part of the TFP's own jargon:

- 'apostates' are those members who leave the organization
- 'white heretics' are Catholics who are not members of TFP" (48).

Cult groups. Moonies.

"I was asked to sacrifice my 'Isaac,' a term used by the Moonies to refer to that which they hold most dear..." (20).

Cult groups. *Set Free Christian Fellowship*.

"I am certain he was trying to enrage me to the point of attacking him. That would have shown all the observers that I was actually an *outlaw* (an outlaw, a fugitive), which in Set Free jargon meant a rebellious person or someone who was 'going back to their old ways'" (16).

When cult groups expand internationally, it is common for them to adopt a set of words that are not translated into local languages, contributing, also through this means, to the creation of their own jargon.

Sokagakkai.

"An article in the *World Tribune* states:

Faith can be called the continuous battle against demons. It is only through obstacles that we can develop, in the same way that the aeroplane uses the friction of the air to create movement... Therefore the appearance of *sansho shima* should make the member rejoice in understanding that he is, in fact, on the path to enlightenment" (28).

In order to differentiate itself, the paranoid contagion group may even introduce orthographic innovations.

Leninist-sectarian groupuscule. SLA.

"[...] Amerikkka..." (21).

Peculiar style

Apart from these linguistic innovations, which shape a jargon, one can observe in some cases how, among the adherents of the same group, a particular *linguistic style* is imposed, induced by reading and by the imitation of companions and the leader. Often, it is a formal language, devoid of insults, vulgarities and excessively colloquial or modern expressions. Or the opposite:

Leninist-sectarian groupuscule. SLA.

"His campaign on this matter had begun shortly after I joined the SLA and intensified my anxiety as it went on, day after day. He complained that I still spoke like a 'rich bourgeois bitch', rather than like an SLA soldier fighting for the poor. I had incorporated the SLA's use of street vulgarities, seasoning my speech with words like *asshole* and *fucking* this or that but I still used words that were not familiar to ordinary people" (21).

Sectarian-Leninist groupuscule. SLA.

"[...] I had to try to speak consciously with double negatives, incorrect grammar and, above all, I had to learn to drop my final g's"(21).

Sectarian-Leninist groupuscule. SLA.

"Can I go to the bathroom?" I asked.

Why do you need to go to the bathroom? Someone asked, laughing.

Because I need to go to the bathroom.

What for? Asked a man with a mocking laugh. Everyone laughed loudly; something struck them as very funny.

I didn't know what was happening until he said[...] if you need to piss say 'I gotta piss'; if you need to shit say 'I gotta shit'. That's how poor people talk"(21).

Museum languages

The determination of some nationalisms to rescue dead or dying languages is mirrored in the insistence of some APs on recovering the classical language (Latin, Sanskrit...) in which their reference sacred texts are written.

I know of no case in which this recovery reached the point of transforming the classical language into a language of everyday use, but there are indeed sectarian groups that require its study.

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"For several years -it can be three or five-, one undergoes theoretical-practical preparation.

We read biblical texts or texts by the founder Correa de Oliveira and we learned Latin" (48).

And, in fact, in the group's texts, citations in Latin appear with a somewhat unusual frequency.

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"Throughout these weeks of persecution, I have received the support and encouragement of a great many people. The Latin adage says: *amicus certus in hora incerta cernitur*. The true friend is discerned in the hour of trial" (7).

The use of the classical language, in the majority of cases, tends to be limited to the ceremonial sphere. And among the cults that rebaptize their adepts with a new name, it is not uncommon for this to be given in the reference language of the group.

Sectarian groups. Hare Krishna.

"He used the name Govirinda" (20).

Sectarian-Leninist groupuscule. SLA.

"It was clear that while serving a sentence at San Quentin, Donald DeFreeze had become politically radicalized and been reborn as Cinque Mtume, the Fifth Prophet [in Swahili], and had embraced the cause *of the people*. Before, he had been a wild, poor, and oppressed Black man who, since the age of sixteen, had been in and out of state penitentiaries" (21).

Dress and external appearance

A second area in which the tendency toward homogenization occurs is that of dress and external appearance.

Naturally, this facet of paranoid behavior cannot be fully manifested in the isolated IP. It is not possible for him to "dress like" the other members of the group since the group does not exist. But what is within his reach is to differentiate himself from his surroundings.

Paranoia.

"[...] perhaps a strange habit, an unusual dress..." (34).

And so it is. It is not uncommon in clinical practice for an unusual style of dress to draw our attention in paranoid patients (I recall a patient over two meters tall who came to the consultation wearing a hat, a threadbare suit, and excessively short trouser legs, or another, a convinced Marxist and trade union activist, who looked more like a Hindu guru), although the motivation put forward by the patient is not necessarily that desire to appear different from others.

Delusion of dermatozoic infestation. Clinical case.

"Another patient in our Manchester series wore three headscarves in her determination to confine the lice" (42).

Absolute equality in clothing is achieved through the use of *uni-forms*, obviously.

Sectarian groups. Divine Church of Salvation.

"His [Taiwanese-born] disciples wear white robes and white Texan hats..." (58).

Maoist Leninism.

"[...] still dressed in her Lenin suit, a kind of uniform for government employees that consisted of a lapel jacket that narrowed at the waist and was complemented by wide trousers" (32).

Nazism.

"The Coburg affairs demonstrated to us how indispensable it was to adopt a regular uniform for the Storm Detachment, not only with the aim of strengthening the spirit of camaraderie but, furthermore, with that of avoiding confusion and the failure to recognize our adversaries..." (25).

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"The uniform of the hermits is made up of a white tunic, hood, brown scapular, Cross of Saint James and red cape. It may only be dispensed with for sleeping" (48).

Unlike the hermits of the TFP, however, the majority of militants in sectarian groups limit the use of uniforms to ritual acts or group meetings. Also, less frequently, they wear them during street proselytizing in order to be recognized.

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"It consists of acting directly on the *man in the street*. The members and cooperators of the TFPs, in addition to offering their publications and proclaiming their slogans, employ in their campaigns the power of symbols that attract and capture the attention and sympathy of the people: striking capes and dashing red banners with the golden rampant lion" (8).

The totalitarian societies of the last century did not go so far as to standardize the dress of all citizens, with the honorable exception of communist China, where there was no alternative but to choose from a very limited number of sober styles, all of them a reminder of the ideals of austerity and modesty characteristic of the new revolutionary China.

Maoist Leninism.

"The appearance of the people was as poor and grey as that of the city; men and women alike wore the grey or blue communist uniform, the same one that through repeated washing had often become completely faded. Everyone wore the same black cotton shoes and the same

haircut; the men cropped short and the women straight and very short. With my Western suit and tie, my leather shoes and a haircut that suddenly seemed to me too long, I looked every inch a foreigner. Lillian, with her printed dress, high heels and a recently waved, fashionable hairstyle, looked like a red poppy in the middle of a field of yellow wheat. I soon acquired a proper communist suit and Lillian went to a tailor to have new clothes made in more muted colors" (11).

The uniform characteristic of nationalisms, in accordance with the romantic conception of the nation, draws inspiration from the dress of peasants of old, although in virtually all cases these garments are reserved for folkloric events. It should be noted that nationalisms are not the only ones that strive to revive traditional dress.

Crisis cults. Lauliwasikaw (19th century).

"... it was necessary to set aside the flint lighter and the whites' dress, to return to the fire stick and to the buckskin clothes of the Indians..." (35).

The uniform par excellence of the citizen of the Nation-State is the military one, which all males wear for some months of their lives. This uniform, in which today the differences between countries, despite the differentiating zeal of nationalism, are scarce, underscores that meeting point at which nations seem to converge: the warlike vocation. It is not without significance that, more than politicians, those who habitually wear a uniform in which the national emblem is never absent are the military, those men to whom falls the defense of the integrity of the territory and the duty of instilling patriotic feeling in young males.

In cults, it is not the use of uniforms that is most common, but rather a somewhat subtler phenomenon: the independence from fashion (with respect to the outside world). The members of the cult group tend to dress and have a similar external appearance. There are cults that seem to encourage long hair while others forbid it; the members of some cults always dress in suits, while those of others prefer "hippy"-style clothes and still others like to wear garments of Japanese cut.

Cult groups. TFP.

"The members always wear a single-color shirt (white or blue), with the top button fastened, a sweater and jacket in winter and a jacket in summer (beige or navy blue)" (48).

Cult groups. A Pentecostalist indigenous community in the Yucatan.

"[...] The women began to come to the temple dressed only in white" (19).

Cult groups. *Set Free Christian Fellowship*.

"Most of those attending that morning were dressed casually; shorts or jeans, some girls with their midriffs showing. What was particularly striking was the presence of some males dressed in biker attire: black outfits and sleeveless cotton jackets, some with the inscription 'Jesus' on the back.

[...] Phil Aguilar, 43, does not fit the stereotype of the typical evangelical pastor. He is an ex-convict, a former drug addict, a 'tough guy' who rides a Harley Davidson with a license plate that reads 'BIKER PAS', alluding to 'biker pastor'. His dark glasses and black horn are almost a trademark for a minister who preaches to bikers and gangs..." (16).

The independence of fashion, an apparently trivial phenomenon, reflects the underlying process of creating a subculture of one's own. In part this may be due to the existence of norms (referring in this case to clothing) that diverge from those of the rest of society and that are binding on adherents. But it also occurs when attire has not been regulated by the group.

Thus, the paranoid contagion group, more or less openly, provides guidance on what should be worn, but also stipulates what should under no circumstances be worn.

Sectarian-Leninist groupuscle. SLA.

"Cin did not approve of jeans, Zoya said, because Black people do not wear them, and such garments do not inspire the necessary respect of the people toward the SLA" (21).

Maoist Leninism.

"When Jean-Paul Sartre converts to Maoism, beguiled by what they believed they had discovered in May 68, the first thing he does is take off his tie" (52).

As a point of curiosity, some paranoid behavior equalizes accessories and the contents of pockets.

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"The only permitted glasses are black-framed ones" (48).

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"The typical 'trousseau' of a TFP member includes some petals from the tomb of Lady Lucilia (which have curative, miraculous properties), a medallion of Lady Lucilia, some official relic of the Church, hairs from Plinio and Lady Lucilia, and a small chain that recalls the devotion of slavery. In his wallet he will carry a photo of Plinio at his first communion, another of Lady Lucilia, and several prayers" (48).

In sectarian groups, with striking regularity, hairstyles tend to become uniform. In paranoid contagion groups, the same tendency.

Nazism.

"Today's girls have already abandoned the ridiculous short mane, and prefer the graceful braided hairstyle..." (61).

Social etiquette

It is curious how regularly paranoid contagion groups create their own exclusive greeting that members use solely among themselves, and not with the rest of the world.

Nazism.

"The provisional president of the Government of Cologne has decreed a provision, in which he states that the 'Hitler salute', as a show of adhesion to the National Socialist Movement, has penetrated so deeply into the consciousness of broad sectors of the population that, although it was originally a symbolic act between politically united persons, today it may be described as the salute of the whole people —above all of the young generation— to the nation and its popular chancellor. The authorities, as executors of the national will, must take into account that this salute, having become a custom in vast sectors of society, must be extended to the entirety of the German population" (May 1933, excerpt from the "Frankfurter Zeitung", cited in 61).

Leninist-sectarian splinter group. SLA.

"It was one of the practices prescribed by the SLA to demonstrate our comradely love by hugging and kissing anyone who returned from any errand, even if it was merely a trip to the corner store. A kiss on the cheek was one thing, but SLA etiquette demanded a proper kiss on the lips" (21).

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"The letters of the adherents end with the farewell 'in Plinio and Lucilia" (48).

Equally common is the tendency to adopt some particular form of address toward one another.

Maoist Leninism.

"Tony Walker, of the 'Financial Times', recalled recently how what had surprised him most upon his return to Beijing, after more than ten years, was the disappearance of the use of

the charismatic word 'tongzhi' (comrade) with which any Chinese citizen would address another..." (37).

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"The treatment among group members is always formal" (48).

The Chinese communists introduced into their revolutionary etiquette... a new way of proposing marriage!, one that was compelled to break with the machismo and hypocrisy of traditional society.

Maoist Leninism.

"Next, and in accordance with the new communist code of morality, which departed radically from the past to impose equality between men and women, he too revealed to her the relationships he had maintained up until then" (32).

Celebrations

No less interesting is the habit of declaring one's own festivities, often commemorating transcendental or heroic moments of the group.

Sokagakkai.

"This assembly of educators at Soka University, in our Year of Education, is very significant, and it is pertinent today to declare this day the Day of the Educational Revolution and to celebrate it annually from now on" (30).

No less.

Nazism.

"National Socialism had its prophet, the *Führer*, with rituals for rallies and mass parades; and even its own holidays. According to historian Robert G. L. Waite: the National Socialist holidays included January 30, the day on which [Hitler] rose to power in the year he called 'the holy year of our Lord 1933,' and April 20, his birthday and the date on which the Hitler Youth were confirmed in their faith" (14).

On these dates, members usually perform important ceremonies.

Nazism.

"The holiest day [...] was November 9, and on it was celebrated the so-called Blood Witness [*Blutzeuge*] of the movement" (14).

Sectarian groups. Moonies.

"... it is a very important ceremony that members practice every first Sunday of the month and on the four sacred days the group has... Members perform three bows until their face touches the ground, before an altar bearing a portrait of Sun Myung Moon, and recite a six-point oath by which they pledge to be faithful to God, to Moon, and to the motherland... Korea" (20).

Jehovah's Witnesses, especially children, occasionally come into conflict with their surroundings due to the express prohibition weighing upon them against celebrating or participating in festivities —such as birthdays— from the outside world. Through their attitude, Witnesses homogenize/differentiate themselves not by what they do but by what they refuse to do.

Acting with less forcefulness, the PCG can also limit itself to ignoring the festivities of *the others*.

Catalan nationalism.

"Homogenizing nationalism is not exclusive to States, but is also characteristic of elites who, in competition with the central State, aspire to create their own political structure. A year ago, at an interesting meeting on Iberian nationalisms held in Southampton, an anthropology paper on Catalan popular festivities was presented, which highlighted the fact that the most well-attended festival in present-day Catalonia is the Feria de Abril of Santa Coloma de Gramenet (a stronghold, as is well known, of Andalusian immigrants). Three million visitors had attended that fair the previous year, an impressive figure when one considers that the total population of Catalonia is six million. However, in a catalogue of festivals and fairs of Catalonia published by the Generalitat, Santa Coloma did not appear" (1).

Eating habits

The homogenizing/differentiating impulse also inspires what is placed on the table daily, especially in PCGs.

A good number of sectarian groups regulate what their followers should eat, or not eat. The impositions and prohibitions are based, more often than not, on dietary opinions relating to the protection of health, on considerations of poverty and austerity, or on religious taboos. Special mention deserves pacifist vegetarianism (such as Hitler's) grounded in the rejection of cruelty toward animals.

In small sectarian groups that practice exotic religions, it is curious to observe how followers develop a certain tendency toward "culinary acculturation." The followers of a Japanese Buddhist group become acquainted with and enjoy Japanese food, those of a Hindu group do likewise with Indian cuisine, and

so on. Underlying this is the same tendency toward internal homogenization — into a new identity — and toward differentiation from the surrounding world.

Group identification symbols

The impulse of PCG members to be *all alike* is also expressed in the use of group identity symbols. On the one hand, there is a tendency toward the intensive use of the group's symbols, and on the other, the reverse of this behavior is the tendency to reject those who do not identify with the PCG. The followers appear to attach great importance to these designs and color combinations, which they associate with intense emotions.

J.O.N.S.

"They had created the national-syndicalist flag, and the yoked arrows on the red and black standards were the pride of that youth, who saw all of this as something of their own and belonging to them" (39)

In modern Nation-States, the intensity of patriotic exaltation is reflected at every moment in the *density* with which, both the administration and citizens, display the country's flag in public places, hang it from windows and place it at the entrance of their homes, as well as in the tendency to stamp small flags on garments and printed materials.

Sectarian groups tend to make the same intensive use — in their headquarters — of the flag, corporate colors and emblems.

Sokagakkai.

"For years, Toda had harbored the dream of an expansion on a truly national scale. In areas such as Osaka and Sendai, vigorous increases in membership had been achieved, but this fell far short of his ideal: to see the Soka Gakkai flags flying in every city and village in Japan" (29).

Sokagakkai.

"After the presentation, flags were presented to the chapters, and to various groups of the Youth Division. The flags featured white cranes, symbols of peace, against backgrounds of different colors... To the left, the Soka Gakkai flag was raised: a crane embroidered in gold thread, against a brown background" (29).

Adherents also tend to carry this type of affiliation marker, visible or hidden, which serve them to make their militancy known and/or to remind themselves of it.

Sectarian groups. TFP.

"Starting in 1965, the entity begins to use another resource in the streets: red banners with a golden rampant lion and the words *Tradition, Family, Property* also in gold" (9).

Aesthetic sense

PCGs tend to "choose" a particular aesthetic, one specific one, which they impose and use in their headquarters and in the spaces they consider their own. Whether we are talking about painting...

Soviet Leninism.

"With sinister symmetry, in Stalinist Russia the banning of Kafka and Picasso was recommended by theorists of the dictatorship. In the first issue of *Soviet Literature*, the critic Kemenov judges 'bourgeois' art as a triumph of mysticism, the subconscious and paranoia, adding: 'Years will pass and future generations who, when studying the history of culture in the age of imperialism, have to become acquainted with the work of Picasso and Sartre, of Henry Moore, Joan Miró and others of that ilk, will invite a psychiatrist and not an art critic to systematize their output. But today, to humanity's shame, these degenerate works of painting and sculpture are accepted as great manifestations. Soviet art develops along the path of socialist realism, brilliantly defined by J. Stalin. And it is this path that has allowed Soviet artists to create an advanced, wholesome art, socialist in its content and national in its form, in the grandiose Stalinist era'. The supreme art to which the academician Kemenov refers is that of those gigantic cheap chromos which in 'decadent' countries are reserved for almanacs. Whoever has had occasion to see one of those canvases of several square meters in which Stalin, astride a white horse, commands a battle in which he never took part, can understand to what extremes of obsequiousness and pompierism one can arrive in a totalitarian country" (5).

Nazism.

"The *Silberspiegel* shall not publish any colored headline drawn in a pictorial style 'that is not the German style'"(5).
(...) than of literature...

Maoist Leninism.

"The forays into poetic creation by the one also known by the nickname of Great Helmsman have been the subject of attention on numerous occasions, but rarely is emphasis placed on the repercussion that his thought and his directives had on all literature in the People's Republic

of China. In fact, literary production following the so-called 'Liberation' of 1949 followed, in one way or another, Mao's directives. His influence extends to the present day and Chinese literature continues, to a large extent, under the shadow of certain principles inherited at that time from Maoism" (17).

(...) than of architecture.

Nazism.

"... Hitler's architectural preference was the pompous neo-Baroque, a style identical to that which accompanied the decline of the Roman and Napoleonic empires. There was no true 'Führer style,' although the party press claimed otherwise. What was declared the official architectural style of the Reich was simply the neoclassical style altered and exaggerated, sometimes to a ridiculous extreme" (57).

Furthermore, the paranoidization induced by the paranoid contagion group causes the members or followers of the group to make these tastes their own, renouncing their previous ones, and applying them in their private sphere, which is obviously more limited.

Music

Nazism.

"We gladly leave Kestenberger, Schönberg and Stravinsky to the pretentious circles abroad. We, the German youth of this generation, are very proud of the legacy of our ancestors in the field of music, and we can no longer permit the great deception of the cultural life of this manifestation into which it is falling, and which is turning the country into the victim of a degradation destined solely to satisfy the musical demand of the night clubs and disreputable international establishments" (Der SA Mann, cited in 23).

Basque nationalism

"The regulations [of the association *Euskaldun Batzokija*, founded by Sabino Arana] prohibit things such as [...] 'genuinely Spanish songs' (art. 12)" (56).

Now then, the very fact of the prohibition reveals that such songs already formed part of the popular musical repertoire; otherwise there would have been no need to ban them. The purge, in turn, creates a genuine illusion. "We are different, and this is evident in the fact that we sing different songs." What is the consequence of the rejection of and hatred toward all things foreign, as the years pass, comes to seem something natural that has occurred "since time immemorial." In this way, the result of nationalist politics and attitudes confirms, albeit deceptively, its own founding postulates.

Law

Among the ancestral elements that romantic nationalism attempts to rescue and preserve for posterity are the laws that in the past governed social coexistence.

Catalan nationalism.

"Along with history, a new romantic legal school emerged, interested in studying the specific Law of each people. Law was considered as the fruit of the consciousness of each people, who created it in their own image and according to their needs. As late as 1906, the Catalan nationalist ideologue and politician, Enric Prat de la Riba, following this conceptualization, wrote that Law 'is a product of the national spirit, source of all the life of the people, principle and root of all manifestations'. The logical consequence of this reasoning involved seeking national differentiations in different legal systems and considering that the nation was also an original legal sentiment" (44).

German nationalism.

"The ideology of national withdrawal manifests itself, almost from the beginnings of German nationalism, within the realm of law and religion. The codes imported from Rome, and later from France, must be replaced by a law that responds more authentically to German customs and mentality. This idea, latent in Arndt and Jahn, is clearly formulated by the jurists of the Romantic era. It will reappear half a century later with H. S. Chamberlain" (11).

Nazism.

"19. We demand the replacement of Roman Law, which serves the materialist conception of the world, by a Germanic Common Law" (from the NSDAP program, February 1920).

Religion

It would not be correct to overlook a field that is also affected by the homogenizing pressure: that of religious beliefs and practices

That this homogenization occurs in the plethora of small religiously oriented APs is something inevitable and inherent to their very nature. As for the rest of the small GPs (those of a political, commercial, healing... orientation), they tend to show indifference toward the religious life of their followers, although the very dynamics of complete absorption by the group tends to attenuate the regularity of religious practices and to dilute beliefs.

As far as nationalisms are concerned, they too have attempted to impose a single faith and religious practice on their citizens, although, it must be acknowledged, only during fascist phases and periods of greatest patriotic fanaticism, and without going to such extremes as the extermination or mass expulsion of heterodox individuals. Nationalisms, in general, limit themselves to restricting the presence (of the heterodox) in public spaces as well as their proselytizing activity, while at the same time making the official status of the truly *national* religion conspicuous.

The religious intransigence of nationalism, in any case, is nothing new on European soil. The Gregorian reform, which took command of the Latin church at the beginning of the millennium, imposed a religious uniformity that broke with the tradition of relative tolerance of the Early Middle Ages, making use for the achievement of that objective of an unsurpassable instrument: the Inquisition. But the religious monolithism (Catholic or Protestant, it matters not) of entire populations with which Western Europe closed the historical cycle of feudalism, in which there was room only for Jews, albeit duly confined to their ghettos, does not constitute *the norm* of the premodern world. Thus, among the Arabs, and for many long centuries, Christians of various denominations have been tolerated and respected, as have Jews, Samaritans, Druze, and small religious groups such as the Mandeans, as ancient as Christianity itself. The same can be said of the Indian subcontinent, where alongside Hinduism other religions have proliferated without any difficulty (Sikhs, Jainists, Parsis...), or of China, where for centuries Tantric Lamaist Buddhism coexisted with Mahayana Buddhism, with Taoism and Confucianism... Thus, while in Western Europe the religious intolerance of certain fascisms may be nothing more than the prolongation of a centuries-old intolerance, in other parts of the planet the religious intransigence of extreme nationalism constitutes a genuine novelty, with hardly any precedents.

The propensity toward religious uniformity arose at the very dawn of the states of collective patriotic exaltation.

"Paris, 8.6.1794 – The president of the convention, Maximilien de Robespierre, celebrates in the garden of the Tuileries the festival of the supreme being. A follower of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Robespierre rejects atheism, which he considers an attitude befitting the wealthy, and sets out to ground the reason of state in a new religious cult..." (10).

Now then, faced with this national religion imposed by the State with a Rousseauian-Jacobin stamp, a Romantic approach to the question of religion subsequently prevailed, an approach that, as in other fields, evolved in two stages. The first of these was the recovery of the *volk* religion, giving it new value or even rescuing it from oblivion.

German nationalism.

"The ideology of national withdrawal manifests itself, almost from the beginnings of German nationalism, within the realm of law and religion [...]"

But the most painful intrusion of the foreign spirit occurred, it seems, in the religious realm. For too long Germany was subjected to Roman Catholicism, which did not suit it. The Lutheran Reformation marked its first liberation. As opposed to conservative Catholics, the majority of liberal nationalists are of Protestant confession. However, Lutheranism itself was soon called into question. Fichte already reproached Luther for having granted too much importance to Saint Paul, who was the one who 'Judaized' Christianity. Arndt, more audacious, accused Christianity itself of having diverted the West from its vocation. The two currents continue to exert influence throughout the nineteenth century. Some, following Fichte, wish to establish a 'German Christianity'; the most representative defender of this tendency is the orientalist Paul de Lagarde (1827-1891), concerned with eliminating any Hebraic element from Christianity. Jesus ceases, for him, to be the son of God, as claimed by the 'biblical legend of the New Testament', which transforms him into a 'rabbi of Nazareth'. On the other hand, and following the publication in 1835 of *Germanic Mythology* by the Brothers Grimm, a 'neo-pagan' current takes shape: one of the organs of the Pan-Germanist League takes in 1899 the title of *Odin*; an entire artificial literature rekindles the memory of the cult of Wotan and Tuisco" (11).

Gandhi's Hinduism constitutes another good example of this first stage. A lawyer of entirely Western formation, and of Anglophile sentiments, discovered (an adulterated) Hinduism through the Theosophical Society, a Western occultist organization. If Gandhi came to settle precisely on Hinduism, it was not in a search for religious authenticity, nor for ultimate Truth or the meaning of human existence, but rather out of a desire — characteristic of Romantic nationalism — to connect with the deep origins of his nation. It is, therefore, a religiosity to which the nationalist arrives through *love of the homeland*.

In a second phase, religious nationalism adopts a hostile attitude toward other religions and attempts to make the national religion the only one visible in public spaces. In India, the shift to the massacre of thousands of Muslims and the attempts to hinduize the whole of society fully were not undertaken by Gandhi or by the Congress Party, but by the national- fundamentalists who in recent years have led mobilizations and achieved significant electoral victories. Gandhi's Hinduism, which dissolved (under the influence of Theosophical esotericism) into a nonexistent universal religion common to all humanity and underlying all the great confessions, is now replaced by an exclusionary and dogmatic Hinduism, which seeks to integrate into a coherent whole (and one set in opposition to all other religions) that heterogeneous amalgam of practices, customs, beliefs, epic narratives, and philosophical musings that Hinduism truly is.

Japanese nationalism in the first half of the last century showed itself openly inclined toward *Shinto* (a *Shinto* of a new stamp, in any case) and hostile to Buddhism and Christianity, foreign religions, which were harassed and compelled to participate in the national cult of the emperor, their leaders being imprisoned when they refused to accept the official directives.

Japanese nationalism

"Once sovereignty was restored to the emperor in the late nineteenth century, the men close to the throne who wielded real power sought to strengthen the position of the crown, as well as their own, by insisting on the superiority of Shintoism over Buddhism. Since in theory the emperor descends from the Shinto Sun Goddess, and is therefore himself a claimant to divinity, popular support for Shintoism meant popular backing for the crown and for those who made use of imperial authority. During the twentieth century, and especially at the height of militarism, Shintoism enjoyed immense protection and Buddhism was reduced to a shameful position" (29).

One characteristic of religious nationalism worthy of noting is the following: the only thing it cares about is the religion of its citizens and of the nation as a whole. What other nations do or believe is of absolutely no concern to it, and it even comes to seem preferable that they have their own religions, clearly differentiated. An attitude in frank contradiction with the universal vocation of the great monotheistic religions.

Curiously, Leninist societies acted in a similar manner, persecuting religions and proclaiming atheism as official doctrine, worthy of being proclaimed and instilled in younger generations. We see, then, the same virulence (or more) in uniformizing the population with regard to religious practices and beliefs... the fruit of one and the same paranoid activation.

In short, the cultural equalization of the adherents of cult groups extends to areas that, by their nature, barely leave traces and easily go unnoticed. One of those areas is that of hobbies. The TFP is a Catholic group with a marked Latin identity, which dreams of a millennium in which the Hispanic and Portuguese-speaking Catholic world will reclaim its rightful place on the planet.

Cult groups. TFP.

"Bullfighting is highly valued. Everyone must talk about bullfighting" (48).

Identity, Utopia, and Enemies

The adoption of a new "cultural uniform" (a uniform insofar as it is shared with the rest of the group's members, but also one that differentiates them from the outside world) allows the adept to clothe themselves in a new identity or personality ().

Typically, the cult member contrasts their personality within the group — marked by the adoption of a new name — with their unfortunate pre-cult personality, which they feel aversion toward and attempt not to return to. On some occasions, this ideal Self, which the cult member must make their own, is extolled as the *authentic* Self, while the previous personality takes on a connotation of imposture, of falsehood, forced upon them by an external agent... the enemy.

Ethnic nationalism reproduces that same dynamic.

Basque nationalism.

"Whether it was lesser or equal [the Francoist political repression in the Basque Country, relative to the rest of Spain and prior to the emergence of ETA], the truth is that no one has presented data to support the particularly furious nature of Francoist repression in Euzkadi before the appearance of ETA; data capable of explaining the resort to violence as an automatic, natural, spontaneous, immediate, almost reflexive movement, in the way that can occur in countries where people face the choice of taking up arms or dying, without ideological mediations playing a decisive role in the action. The only death that threatened the first ETA members, who began to act during a period of incipient softening and liberalization of the Francoist regime relative to its extreme initial harshness, was a symbolic death, the death of an idea that seethed in their minds under the influence of Sabinian ideology, the death of a Euzkadi, of an ideal Basque people, that by then existed only in the books they read and of which not a trace remained in their daily lives" (2).

Indeed, if it turns out that, for the patriot, the language he has spoken since childhood, the customs he has lived by, the music he has enjoyed... are foreign to his true being (national), then it turns out that his true identity... is dead.

The purification process in which nations and nationalists embark, through the systematic and laborious elimination of any foreign cultural element, is, at the same time, the path that leads to a lost Paradise —that of authenticity— which in reality never existed. Cultural resurrection serves as an argument for messianic thinking.

And, insofar as the loss of one's own identity can be attributed to the intentional and persistent action of an external enemy (it matters not that to do so one must force historical arguments to the point of absurdity), the arguments are set in place with which to identify the enemy to be confronted and against whom to unite.

Basque nationalism.

"Certainly because of Francoism, but not only because of Francoism, as even a simple chronological map of the retreat of the Basque language could attest. Only the inaccurate attribution to Francoist violence of the entire responsibility for the non-realization of the idea of Euzkadi that was fermenting in their minds, and the abusive equation between such a situation and death or complete indignity, made the ETA's consideration that there was no option left but armed struggle partially valid" (2).

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